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Portfolio Management for Privately-Held 
Securities: Investment Selection and 
Performance Measurement
Terry Dorsey
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper develops a portfolio model for performance measurement and 
selection of investment securities for which there is no public market: invest­
ments such as venture capital investments, private placements, or real estate 
partnerships. The paper can be used as the basis of research to measure the 
risk/retum  properties of privately-held securities, and such research can be 
used to develop portfolio measurement tools for these securities.
The paper proceeds as follows:
1. It reviews recent conclusions that traditional measures of financial risk
do not adequately describe the riskiness of venture capital investments and 
other privately-held securities with the following characteristics:
a) Lack of market price
b) Investment illiquidity
c) Multi-year holding period
2. It describes two recent papers—^Ruhnka and Young (1991) and Ruh- 
nka, Feldman, and Dean (1992)—which report on investor perception of two 
types of venture capital risk: the risk of losing capital and the risk posed by 
the “living dead” phenomenon. Those risks are consistent with the risk 
measures incorporated in the portfolio model, risk of loss and risk of oppor­
tunity.
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3. It develops two independent measures of investment risk inherent in 
venture capital investments and uses a simple example to illustrate how they 
can impact portfolio return. These are:
A. Risk of loss: loss of portfolio capital through unprofitable investments.
B. Risk of opportunity: loss of return that derives fi’om an inability to 
reinvest illiquid, unprofitable capital in more profitable situations. This 
amounts to an opportunity cost for improfitable capital and has been 
discussed as the “living dead” phenomenon in venture capital literature.
4. Development of a multiperiod, multiinvestment portfolio model be­
gins with the following equation which states the relative contribution that 
each investment makes to performance of the portfolio:
Z Z
j;G (l + nr=F(l + r)», J^Q=V, 
i=l i=l
where Q = amount of capital invested in situation i;
n = geometric mean return of investment i; 
n = investment holding period, in years; 
z = number of investments in the portfolio;
V= total capital invested in the portfolio; and 
r= geometric mean return objective for portfolio
The value of the portfolio at the end of year n equals V(1 + r)”: initial 
invested capital plus gains made by profitable investments minus losses.
5. The portfolio is next partitioned into two segments whose respective 
components include profitable investments and unprofitable investments, 
and the equation is solved for rf
r^=[{(l + r )» - l+ P  + |il}/P]‘/« - l ,
where P = portion of total capital invested in profitable investments; 
and
|i. = portion of total capital lost to unprofitable investments.
The value of rp defines that target rate of return which the profitable 
portion of the portfolio must achieve in order for the total portfolio to
A. Recover capital losses;
B. Offset returns lost through investment of portfolio capital in unprof­
itable, illiquid situations; and
C. Achieve overall portfolio return otgectives.
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6. The model can now be used to compute a target rate of return 
adjusted for the two types of risk described above.
7. It uses actual cashflow data for 110 venture capital investments over a 
period of 120 months to illustrate how the model can measure risk-reward 
characteristics of these privately-held investments.
8. In order better to handle the reinvestment of interim investment 
cashflows, the paper presents a slighdy enhanced portfolio model that sub­
stitutes the modified internal rate of return for the geometric mean return 
used in the original model.
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SmaU Business Credit Risk: 
Perceptions of Commercial Banks in Missouri
Jan R. Squires
I. INTRODUCTION
A survey o f548 Missouri commercial banks asked respondents to rank, among 
other items, alternative definitions of credit risk for small business borrowers; 
alternative bank responses to deteriorating small business credit risk; and 
alternative characteristics of a “high risk” small business borrower. Data were 
collected from 137 (25%) responding commercial banks, and this paper 
focused on responses to the above questions for the entire sample and for 
subsamples defined by a set of bank characteristics.
Small business credit risk is seen generally to reside in the chance that the 
borrower will default outright on the loan; however, some banks also define 
risk in terms of the chance that the loan will not be repaid according to 
original terms. The most common bank reactions to increasing credit riski­
ness are to require additional security/compensating balances, additional 
equity capital, and additional personal guarantees; some banks do attach 
more importance to requiring substantial paydowns, raising the interest rate, 
and/or restructuring the maturity of the loan. “High risk” in a small business 
borrower is signified by lack of management ability/poor planning, high 
levels of debt and low levels of equity, and poor profit margins.
In general, these responses are consistent across bank types and charac­
teristics; however, some significant differences do exist. For example, larger 
banks place greater emphasis on:
1. failing to meet original loan terms as a facet of credit risk;
2. raising the interest rate in response to deteriorating credit risk; and
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3. inadequate asset value as a “high risk” borrower characteristic.
Less aggressive banks tend to emphasize more:
1. faihng to provide adequate loan security as a facet of credit risk; and
2. requiring paydowns in response to deteriorating credit.
Suburban banks give greater weight to:
1. raising the interest rate in response to deteriorating credit risk; and
2. low interest coverage as a facet of “high risk” borrower status.
The results tend to confirm prior research findings as well as often-voiced 
“conventional wisdom” regarding small business borrowers; that is, elabora­
tion of business expertise, evidence of sound planning, and attention to 
reasonable financial projections, especially pertaining to leverage levels and 
profit margins, will all be an important part of the lender’s initial decision 
and ongoing assessment with respect to the credit relationship. The extent 
to which adequate equity capital, security, and guarantees exist will be an 
integral part of the monitoring process as well. Finally, borrowers should 
expect to find similar parameters and fairly consistent lending postures across 
different bank types and characteristics; that is, bank location, profitability, 
lending aggressiveness, ownership status, and the like seem to make only 
small differences in the assessment of the small business credit relationship.
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